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‘An old carriage with new horses’: Nietzsche’s critique of democracy1 
 
Abstract: Debates about Nietzsche’s political thought today revolve around his role in 
contemporary democratic theory: is he a thinker to be mined for stimulating 
resources in view of refounding democratic legitimacy on a radicalised, postmodern 
and agonistic footing, or is he the modern arch-critic of democracy budding 
democrats must hone their arguments against? Moving away from this dichotomy, 
this article asks first and foremost what democracy meant for Nietzsche in late 
nineteenth century Germany, and on that basis what we might learn from him now. To 
do so, it will pay particular attention to the political, intellectual and cultural contexts 
within which Nietzsche’s thought evolved, namely Bismarck’s relationship to the new 
German Reichstag, the philological discovery of an original Aryan race, and 
Nietzsche’s encounter with Gobineau’s racist thought through his frequentation of the 
Wagner circle. It argues that Nietzsche’s most lasting contribution to democratic 
thinking is not to be found in the different ways he may or may not be used to buttress 
certain contemporary ideological positions, but rather how his notions of ‘herd 
morality’, ‘misarchism’ and the genealogical method still provides us with the 
conceptual tools to better understand the political world we inhabit. 
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A common refrain in the contemporary scholarship is that during his so-called 
‘middle period’, commonly understood as spanning both books of Human, all too 
human (1878-1880), Daybreak (1881) and the first four books of The Gay Science 
(1882), Nietzsche demonstrates a favourable disposition towards democracy.
2
 The 
Wanderer and his Shadow 293 (1880, KSA 2 685), ‘End and means of democracy’ in 
particular is offered up by writers such as Connolly, Owen, Patton and Schrift as 
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typifying Nietzsche’s allegedly pro-democratic sentiment.3 There Nietzsche explains 
that ‘democracy wants to create and guarantee as much independence as possible: 
independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment’. So far, one might be 
tempted to say, so good from a democratic point of view, although Nietzsche has yet 
to give reasons for desiring such independence in the first place. This is consistent 
with the view that in his middle period Nietzsche demonstrates a more ‘neutral’ or 
‘scientific’ approach, adopting democracy’s own point of view (‘to that end’) and 
trying to think through its logical consequences. But he has yet to endorse it.  
The discussion surrounding The Wanderer and his Shadow 293 takes place 
within a broader debate about the role Nietzsche is to play in contemporary 
democratic theory. A number of different thinkers, such as Bonnie Honig, Wendy 
Brown, Dana Villa, William Connolly and Mark Warren amongst others, along with 
more specifically Nietzsche scholars such as Lawrence Hatab, Alan Schrift and David 
Owen, have seized upon Nietzsche’s alleged decentring of the human being as a 
means of revitalising (American) democracy on a radicalised, postmodern basis, 
moving away from a conception of democracy too stuck, in their minds, in a religious 
and naturalistic vision of man now considered obsolete.
4
 Much of this literature has 
been articulated through the theme of ‘agonistic’ democracy, and finds as its 
springboard Nietzsche’s writings on the agon in his early unpublished essay ‘Homer’s 
Contest’ (1872, KSA 1 786).5 In this account, Nietzsche is often paired with Weber, 
Schmitt and Arendt amongst others – the latter offered as the whiggish democratic 
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end-point of a story to which the others often do not seem to immediately fit.
6
 For this 
group, many different ways in which Nietzsche’s thinking could be made congenial to 
democracy have been suggested, including Connolly’s idea of ‘agonistic respect’, 
Owen’s concept of ‘agonistic deliberation’, with a view to ‘ennobling democracy’, 
Hatab’s ‘adversarial system’, or even Arendt’s ‘robust public sphere’, which has also 
been linked to Nietzsche’s idea of the agon.7  
Against this view other authors, such as Bruce Detwiler, Peter Berkowitz, 
Peter Bergmann, Fredrick Appel and Don Dombowksy have emphasised Nietzsche’s 
aristocratic leanings.
8
 It is important to note here that as most – I think Hatab is alone 
in claiming that Nietzsche should have been a democrat – agree on the fundamentally 
aristocratic, that is to say hierarchical or slave-based, nature of Nietzsche’s political 
thought, the question was always going to be whether Nietzsche’s political thinking 
could be used for democratic purposes, or at least in what manner.
9
 Rejecting the 
former group’s approach, this latter group have been more interested in portraying 
Nietzsche as the arch anti-democrat of our times, whose sole role is to serve as the 
main argumentative opponent against which budding democratic theorists need 
confront their ideas. The tell-tale sign of this approach is in the presentation of 
Nietzsche as an Emersonian ‘provocateur’, or again the attempt to link him to more 
liberal thinkers such as J. S. Mill and sometimes Tocqueville (in France Nietzsche is 
often depicted as ‘un Tocquevillien enragé’).10 The aim here is to isolate Nietzsche’s 
critique of democracy from his other more positive pronouncements about what 
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should be done about democracy – pronouncements that will be the subject of this 
paper. In this account Nietzsche’s critique of democracy as ‘herd morality’ is equated 
to Mill or Tocqueville’s ‘tyranny of the majority’.  
Both schools of interpretations are thus guilty of wanting to ‘domesticate’ 
Nietzsche.
11
 The ‘agonists’, by simply picking and choosing elements of Nietzsche’s 
thought that fit their project without seriously engaging with his fundamentally 
aristocratic thinking, have transformed Nietzsche into an unlikely cheerleader to their 
cause.
12
 On the other hand the ‘anti-democrats’, by corralling Nietzsche’s critique of 
democracy from his broader vision, have made Nietzsche ‘safe for liberal-democracy’ 
by lining him up with less threatening liberal critiques of democracy such as Mill and 
Tocqueville who have already been tamed by contemporary democratic theory. By 
this is meant that whilst Mill and Tocqueville are thought to have offered a more 
‘internal’ critique of democracy which aimed at ameliorating democratic politics 
within its own structure, Nietzsche might best be understood as offering an ‘external’ 
critique of democracy which had no particular truck in the preservation of democracy 
at all. Indeed, if in Nietzsche’s description of the irresistible democratisation of 
Europe in The Wanderer and his Shadow above we hear an echo of Tocqueville’s 
‘providential fact’ of democracy, the latter’s aim was to reconcile what he took to be 
the virtues of the aristocratic system within a democratic context, whereas for 
Nietzsche the relation the two entertain with one another was thought of in a much 
more external manner. So Nietzsche must not solely be understood as a critique of 
democracy, as this line of interpretation suggests, but his theories of the future 
development of democracy must also be taken seriously.  
In many ways this debate, therefore, represents two sides of the same coin. 
Both groups of thinkers take democracy as we now understand it as their starting 
point and then try to figure out what Nietzsche has to say to it, either positively in that 
Nietzsche offers stimulating resources with which to think through a refounding of 
democratic legitimacy, or negatively, as someone who offers the sharpest critique of 
democracy democratic theorists must endeavour to refute. The aim of this article is to 
move away from this dichotomy not with the goal of refuting it, but instead of 
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examining what uses can be made of Nietzsche for contemporary democratic theory, 
it wishes to ask first and foremost what Nietzsche himself understood by democracy 
during his time, and from that point trying to think about how his perspective can help 
us better conceptualise our understanding of democracy today. I thus posit two 
moments of interpretative work – first historical then contemporary – instead of 
immediately asking for Nietzsche’s contemporary relevance. This cuts to the heart of 
the methodological disagreement I have with much of the secondary literature on 
Nietzsche in general, and with this debate in particular: that instead of coming to 
Nietzsche with predetermined categories to commit an anachronism, we must start 
with the historical Nietzsche, to see how he thought about the topic at hand and what 
he had to say about it, before drawing conclusions (if any), about how it relates to our 
own world, over a century later.
13
  
My goal is twofold: on the one hand to show that a more detailed engagement 
with Nietzsche’s writings on democracy can allow us to overcome the opposition 
between the so-called ‘gentle’ (proto-democratic) and ‘bloody’ (the politics of 
domination) Nietzsche,
14
 so as to better see the role both democracy and aristocracy 
play in his vision of the European future. To do so, this chapter will pay particular 
attention to the political, intellectual and cultural contexts within which Nietzsche’s 
thought evolved, namely Bismarck’s relationship to the new German Reichstag, the 
philological discovery of an original Aryan race, and Nietzsche’s encounter with 
Gobineau’s racist thought through his frequentation of the Wagner circle. It will 
reveal Nietzsche to be a particular astute guide to understanding the politics of his 
time. On the other I wish to argue that what should be Nietzsche’s most lasting 
contribution to democratic thinking is not to be found in the different ways he may or 
may not be used to buttress certain contemporary ideological positions, but rather to 
illustrate how his notions of ‘herd morality’, ‘misarchism’ and the genealogical 
method, alongside his critique of majoritarianism, provides us with the conceptual 
tools to better understand the political world we inhabit today. I do not mean to 
suggest that mining Nietzsche for thinking about contemporary democratic politics 
might not yield stimulating results, quite the contrary, or indeed that the hierarchical 
nature of Nietzsche’s thought is not something that needs to be re-emphasised, 
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something I wish to do too – mine is not, as such, a purely critical enterprise – but I 
do mean to suggest that the richest legacy Nietzsche provides us with in thinking 
about democracy is precisely those intellectual tools he fashioned for himself to 
understand democracy as he experienced it; tools which are as ever needful today.  
 
 
I: Democracy in the Kaiserreich 
 
Nietzsche’s political coming-of-age coincided with the birth of the German Empire, 
the Kaiserreich. His productive life spanned the gradual democratisation of Germany, 
in which he retained a close, if critical, interest in. Notwithstanding his ‘untimely’ 
pose, Nietzsche kept very much abreast of politics, admitting in his older age that he 
was an avid reader of the Journal de débats, which reported on French parliamentary 
politics, along with the Journal de Goncourt and the Revue des deux Mondes.
15
 
Indeed, for three years Nietzsche would have participated directly in a democratic 
election: in 1867 the first free elections were organised in Northern Germany, but the 
age threshold had been set at 25; Nietzsche was then 22. However there is every 
reason to believe that if he could have he would have voted, and he followed the 
elections closely with his friends.
16
 
 The next general election was held after unification, on the 3 March 1871, but 
by that time Nietzsche was already in Basel and had renounced German citizenship. 
There he became acquainted with Swiss democracy, which, whilst he commended it 
for its tolerance,
17
 he was ultimately very critical of.
18
 Jacob Burckhardt had entered 
his intellectual orbit by this time too, and Burckhardt, who had experienced first-hand 
revolutionary movements, served as a very reactionary influence on Nietzsche’s view 
of democracy. In fact, in September 1869, four months after Nietzsche had given his 
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inaugural lecture, the First International held its Fourth Congress in Basel. One of its 
attendants was Mikhail Bakunin.
19
 
 The view that Nietzsche had no experience of democracy, and that if he had 
had, he would have been much more sympathetic to it, must thus be accepted with 
considerable reserve.
20
 It is certainly the case that nineteenth century German 
democracy looked very different to democracy as we know it today, but returned to its 
historical context, the German suffrage was actually one of the most extensive of its 
time: Margaret Anderson, a leading scholar of this period, describes Germany during 
this epoch as a ‘suffrage regime’.21 So Nietzsche did have an experience of certain 
democratic practices – and indeed perhaps one of the fullest one could have had at the 
time – however that experience is somewhat removed from what we would know 
today. But being present ‘at the birth’ of the rise of democracy in Germany, Nietzsche 
is a privileged witness to the general ‘transition to democracy’ which was taking place 
in Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century. As such his commentary is 
especially valuable, as he was alive to the historical context of such a development. 
Moreover, the world he inhabited contained a much larger diversity of political 
systems, allowing him to compare and contrast lived experiences – we can think of 
his travels to Switzerland, Italy and France. Finally, he did not suffer from ‘hindsight 
bias’, in the sense that there was no pre-determined path to democracy, meaning that 
his political horizon remained clear. 
 Nietzsche appears to have an acute grasp of what democracy in his time 
amounted to (or not). In The Wanderer and his Shadow 293 – to return to our opening 
aphorism and the period we identified as Nietzsche’s first sustained engagement with 
the topic – Nietzsche concludes the passage in question with the line: ‘that which now 
calls itself democracy differs from the older forms of government solely in that it 
drives with new horses: the streets are still the same old streets, and the wheels 
likewise the same old wheels’. The implication is that whilst there is a new political 
institution – the Reichstag (the ‘new horses’) – politics has changed little in the new 
Reich: Bismarck and the Junkers still rule (‘same old wheels’ of power) behind the 
parliamentary façade, and continue to implement their nationalist realpolitik (‘same 
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old [policy] streets’). ‘Have things really got less perilous because the wellbeing of 
nations now ride in this vehicle?’, Nietzsche rhetorically asks, questioning the 
purported superiority and pacific nature of the new regime.
22
  
 Moreover, Nietzsche was able to develop criticisms of democracy in his time 
which were to become staple critiques of modern democratic regimes. He was, for 
one, quite alive to the dangers of majoritarian rule. In ‘The right of universal suffrage’ 
he explains that ‘a law that decrees that the majority shall have the decisive voice in 
determining the wellbeing of all cannot be erected upon a foundation which is first 
provided by that law itself’ (WS 276, KSA 2 673). To secure its foundation it requires 
in the first place the unanimous consent of all: ‘universal suffrage may not be an 
expression of the will merely of the majority, the whole country must desire it’. This 
it fails to achieve: ‘as hardly two-thirds of those entitled to vote, perhaps indeed not 
even a majority of them, come to the ballot-box, this is a vote against the entire 
suffrage-system’. Democracy never founds itself, and continual non-participation 
implies a rejection of the regime as a whole: ‘non-participation in an election 
constitutes precisely such an objection and thus brings about the downfall of the entire 
voting-system’. As a significant minority23 does not participate in voting then the 
system never succeeds in marshalling the foundation it needs, thereby simply 
becoming the un-assented, and undemocratic, rule of a majority. 
Earlier in ‘Permission to speak!’ of Human, all too human (1878), Nietzsche 
had argued for minorities’ right of secession. Accommodating himself – continuing in 
the ‘realist’ mode of his middle-period – to democracy as one ‘accommodates oneself 
when an earthquake has displaced the former boundaries and contours of the ground 
and altered the value of one’s property’, Nietzsche accepts that if the majority want to 
rule themselves with their ‘five or six ideas’ through ‘self-determination’, then so be 
it; but on the same account those few who do not want ‘all of politics’ to be 
understood in this way should be able to ‘step a little aside’ (HH 438, KSA 2 286). 
Taken together with his exposure of democracy’s failing to ground itself through the 
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consent of all, Nietzsche here pinpoints one of the major criticisms of the ideal of 
popular sovereignty – its application to minorities, who are either subsumed within a 
larger majority that may deny their interests and values (as above), or else must be 
allowed, on the same basis of self-determination, to constitute smaller sovereign 
communities of their own.
24
 
 
 
II: Democracy and aristocracy 
 
In The Wanderer and his Shadow 293, to return to the aphorism with which we 
opened, Nietzsche explains – and alarmingly so for those who want to see in him a 
positive disposition towards democracy – that the logic of democratic independence 
dictates that ‘it needs to deprive of the right to vote both those who possess no 
property and the genuinely rich…since they continually call its task into question’. 
Congruently, ‘it must prevent everything that seems to have for its objective the 
organisation of parties. For the three great enemies of independence in the above-
names threefold sense are the indigent, the rich and the parties’. The poor are 
dependent upon others, and therefore likely to be swayed; the rich are simply too 
powerful; and political parties stifle independent thought in the name of the party line. 
Whilst Nietzsche qualifies such statements with the claim that he is speaking of 
democracy as ‘something yet to come’ – which might play into the hands of the 
postmodern democratic agenda – this is a rather inauspicious start for a modern 
understanding of democracy premised upon universal political equality and mediated 
through political parties. 
What the authors who interest themselves in this passage are right to highlight 
is that this period represents one of Nietzsche’s first attempt to theoretically grapple 
with the rising tide of democracy in Europe. Yet it is not clear that this analysis issues 
in a defence of democracy instead of its critique. Indeed, in the aphorism with which 
he opens his reflexions on democracy in The Wanderer and his Shadow, ‘The age of 
cyclopean building’, Nietzsche ultimately conceives of it as a means to a new form of 
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aristocracy: ‘the democratisation of Europe is a link in the chain of those tremendous 
prophylactic measures[…]only now is it the age of cyclopean building!’ (WS 275, 
KSA 2 671). Continuing to adopt his more neutral standpoint, Nietzsche in this 
passage also shows his realism, explaining that ‘the democratisation of Europe is 
irresistible: for whoever tries to halt it has to employ in that endeavour precisely the 
means which the democratic idea first placed in everyone’s hands’. The ‘means’ in 
question here are those Nietzsche associated with the aims of democracy he identified 
in the section above, namely those of independence. In Nietzsche’s eyes, the logic of 
democracy in creating and guaranteeing as much independence as possible is in the 
end to provide – involuntarily so – the foundations upon which a new aristocracy will 
come about. Moreover, the only way to oppose this democratisation is to create 
barriers to remain independent from it – barriers which democracy is precisely 
creating in the first place – hence speeding up the process even more. 
Nietzsche expresses anxiety about those who engage in this democratic work 
of building protective stone dams and walls: they appear ‘a little purblind and stupid’, 
there is something ‘desolate and monotonous in their faces, and grey dust seems to 
have got even into their brain’. But posterity will judge them kindly, as it is thanks to 
their efforts in building the ‘stone dams’ and ‘protective walls’ that guarantee 
independence that the ‘orchards of culture’ will no longer be destroyed overnight by 
the ‘wild senseless mountain torrents’ of ‘barbarians’ and ‘plagues’. It is they who lay 
the foundations for the new ‘highest artist in horticulture, who can only apply himself 
to his real task when the other is fully accomplished!’. Because of the time that lies 
between ‘means and end’, those who build the walls and trellises think they 
themselves are the ends, but that is because ‘noone yet sees the gardener or the fruit-
trees for whose sake the fence exists’.  
The vision of democracy Nietzsche provides in The Wanderer and his Shadow 
– one in which democracy provides the building blocks for the appearance of a new 
aristocracy, the ‘highest artist in horticulture’, of the future – is strikingly similar to 
the one found in Beyond Good and Evil 242 (KSA 5 182), where Nietzsche explains 
that what he is ‘trying to say is: the democratisation of Europe is at the same time an 
involuntary exercise in the breeding of tyrants – understanding that word in every 
sense, including the most spiritual’. Whilst the logic of these passages is different – 
although complementary, as I will argue – the conclusion that Nietzsche draws of his 
study of democracy in both these periods is remarkably congruent: that it is a 
11 
 
stepping-stone towards a new form of aristocracy. This puts pressure on the idea of 
the exceptional nature of Nietzsche’s middle period, which would render it more 
pliable to a positive democratic reading, and, consequently, on the notion that there 
are no strong continuities in Nietzsche’s political reflexion, in this instance when it 
comes to democracy. 
 
 
III: Misarchism, Christianity and herd morality  
 
Beyond Good and Evil (1886), along with its ‘annexe’ The Genealogy of Morality 
(1887) and book V of The Gay Science (1887), also penned around this time, 
represents Nietzsche’s second major moment of grappling with democracy after The 
Wanderer and his Shadow, with which it entertains strong links as we saw above. 
During this period Nietzsche makes three of his most famous claims about 
democracy: that the ‘democratic movement is the heir to Christianity’, which is itself 
linked to ‘herd morality’ (BGE 202, KSA 5 124); that is it a form of ‘misarchism’, the 
democratic mind-set that is opposed to all forms of authority (GM II 12, KSA 5 315); 
and that it represents a form of political and physiological degeneration (BGE 203, 
KSA 5 126). To these we now turn. 
 In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche declares: ‘morality in Europe these days 
is herd morality’. Later in the text Nietzsche will explain that there are two types of 
morality, a ‘master’ and a ‘slave’ morality, corresponding to a view of the world as 
either differentiated by ‘good and bad’ or ‘good and evil’ respectively, which he will 
go on to explore in a more systematic manner in the first essay of the Genealogy. 
There he explains that it is slave morality, through a ‘Revaluation of all Values’, 
which has come to rule over Europe. It is Christianity that brings herd morality into 
politics: ‘this morality is increasingly apparent in even political and social institutions: 
the democratic movement is the heir to Christianity’ (BGE 202, KSA 5 124). 
The problem is not herd morality as such, but its belief that it is the only 
morality possible, and that this morality should be imposed on everyone else. 
However herd morality ‘stubbornly and ruthlessly declares “I am morality itself and 
12 
 
nothing else is moral!”’. 25  In the Preface to Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche 
describes dogmatism as one of the ‘worst, most prolonged, and most dangerous of 
errors’ that philosophy has ever made (BGE P, KSA 5 1). This is evident in herd’s 
morality’s dogmatic claim that it is the only morality possible, and thus its view 
should be imposed upon the rest of the population. More specifically, Nietzsche 
associates this dogmatism with Plato’s ‘the Good in itself’, but unlike modern herd 
morality, Plato only believed these pure forms where accessible to an initiated few. 
What makes modern Europeans believe they now know the answer to Socrates’ 
question of what ‘good and evil’ is, is Christianity (BGE 202, KSA 5 124), which 
democratises Plato’s teaching: ‘Christianity is Platonism for the “people” (BGE P, 
KSA 5 1). 
Against this, Nietzsche writes that ‘as we understand things’, herd morality is 
‘only one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many 
other (and especially higher) moralities are or should be possible’ (BGE 202, KSA 5 
124). But herd morality fights ‘tooth and nail’ against such a ‘possibility’. Indeed, 
already in Human, all too human Nietzsche had explained that he had nothing to 
object to those of the herd, with their ‘five or six ideas’, who want to ‘forge for 
themselves their own fortunes and misfortunes’, although he warns they should be 
prepared to bear the ‘calamitous consequences of their own narrow-mindedness’ (HH 
438, KSA 2 286). The problem is that, believing they and only they are and can be 
right, they desire to impose their ideas about ruling on everyone else, whereas 
Nietzsche demands that those who do not share these ideals be allowed to ‘step a little 
aside’.26 So Nietzsche wants a space within which those who desire to pursue their 
cultural calling can do so according to the morality that befits such a situation, which 
herd morality, in claiming it is the only type or morality possible, violently opposes.
27
  
 In the Genealogy, Nietzsche coins the term ‘misarchism’ to describe 
democracy, to ‘coin a bard word for a bad thing’, as he puts it (GM II 12, KSA 5 
315). Misarchism is the ‘democratic idiosyncrasy of being against everything that 
dominates and wants to dominate’.28  The democratic mind-set is thus against all 
                                                 
25
 On herd morality’s universalising claims, see further: Raymond Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Morality’ in 
Morality, Culture and History: Essays on German Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 167-197 
26
 See previous section for minorities right of secession.  
27
 Brian Leiter, in his Nietzsche on Morality, explores this idea well. 
28
 We can discern the germs of this thought already in GSt p. 171 (KSA 1 786), where Nietzsche 
explains that the aim of the ‘liberal-optimistic world view’, which has its roots in in French Revolution, 
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types of authority. This relates back to how herd morality came to power in the first 
place – the ‘slave revolt in morality’ (GM II 7, KSA 5 305) – which came through 
opposing the institutions of master morality. Indeed, ‘slave morality from the start 
says No to what is “outside”, “other”, “a non-self”’ (GM I 10, KSA 5 271).  
There is a strong link here to the question of independence that Nietzsche 
identified as one of the hallmarks of democracy in Human, all too human, which 
aimed to promote ‘independence of opinion, mode of life and employment’. In terms 
of ‘misarchism’, it is the democratic mind-set of refusing any type of intellectual 
authority that is most prominent, and consequently a desire to be able to form one’s 
own opinion. But the element of independence of mode of life and employment also 
comes to the fore. In the past men felt predestined to their line of work, and this lead 
to the establishment of the ‘broad-based social pyramids’ that are medieval ‘estates, 
guilds and inherited trade privileges’. In democratic societies, however, where people 
have unlearnt this faith, ‘the individual is convinced he can do just about anything and 
is up to playing any role’ (GS 356, KSA 3 595). This means that anyone feels they 
can exercise certain professions – namely those relating to culture and education – 
that were not open to them before, and to which Nietzsche does not believe they are 
up to.
29
 ‘Upon deeper consideration’, Nietzsche concludes, ‘the role has actually 
become character; and artifice, nature’: men actually end up becoming the role they 
gave themselves.  
 The predominance of the actor comes at the price of the ‘great “architects”’, 
those who have the ‘strength to build’, the ‘courage to make far-reaching plans’, who 
dare to undertake works that would require ‘millennia to complete’ (GS 356, KSA 3 
595). Modern man’s ever-shifting nature means that  
what is dying out is that fundamental faith on the basis of which someone 
could calculate, promise, anticipate the future in a plan on that grand 
scale…the basic faith that man has worth and sense only insofar as he is a 
stone in a great edifice; to this end he must be firm above all, a 
‘stone’…above all not an actor! 
 
                                                                                                                                           
is to ‘dissolve the monarchical instincts of the people’ through the spread of universal suffrage. On 
Nietzsche’s hierarchical understanding of Greek politics, see my forthcoming article ‘Nietzsche 
theorist of the state?’ in History of Political Thought.  
29
 See TI Germans 5 (KSA 6 107): ‘”Higher education” and horde – that are in contradiction from the 
outset. Any higher education is only for the exception: you have to be privileged to have the right to 
such a high privilege’.  
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‘From now on will never again be built, can never again be built’, Nietzsche 
concludes, ‘is – a society in the old sense of the term’. ‘To build that, everything is 
lacking, mainly the material’.  
 This passage as a whole has given rise to much debate. On the one hand are 
those who submit this section as an example of how Nietzsche does not have a 
positive political vision (no possibility of a new society being built), and on the other 
those who offer Nietzsche’s reflexions on the democratic figure of the actor as an 
example of his pro-democratic views.
30
 Both are, to my mind, mistaken. In terms of 
this section, what is most important to emphasise is how it is a society in the ‘old 
sense’ of the word – i.e. a medieval guild one – which can no longer be built. But, 
pace those who do not see a positive political programme in Nietzsche, the 
democratisation of Europe offers the opportunity of building a society in a ‘new 
sense’ of the word, and this society, contra those who want to construe Nietzsche as a 
proto-democrat, will not be egalitarian, as we will now see. 
 
 
IV: Degeneration and the ‘Good European’ 
 
A strong theme within Nietzsche’s discussion of democracy is its association with 
physical degeneration.
31
 In Beyond Good and Evil 203, Nietzsche explains that for 
him the ‘democratic movement is not merely an abased form of political organisation, 
but rather an abased (more specifically diminished) form of humanity, a 
mediocritisation and depreciation of humanity in value’. Democracy finds its social 
and anthropological origin in the ‘democratic mixing of classes and races’ (BGE 224, 
KSA 5 160), the ‘mixing of blood between masters and slaves’ (BGE 261, KSA 5 
212). This mixing of ‘master’ and ‘slave’ morality occurs through intermarriage 
between different castes, and the resulting conflict between the two value systems – 
without either getting the upper hand – that is incarnated in their offspring results in a 
general indecision and slowness in the population at large: 
The different standards and values, as it were, get passed down through the 
bloodline to the next generation where everything is in a state of restlessness, 
                                                 
30
 See Owen, ‘Nietzsche, Ethical Agency and the Problem of Democracy’ and William Connolly, 
‘Debate: Reworking the Democratic Imagination’ in The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 5 (2), 
1997, p. 201. 
31
 Not be confused with its cultural counterpart, decadence. 
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disorder, doubt, experimentation. The best forces have inhibitory effects, the 
virtues themselves do not let each other strengthen and grow, both body and 
soul lack a centre of balance, a centre of gravity and the assurance of a 
pendulum (BGE 208, KSA 5 137).   
 
‘What is most profoundly sick and degenerate about such hybrids is the will’, 
Nietzsche continues, ‘they no longer have any sense of independence in decision-
making, or the bold feeling of pleasure in willing’. 32  Democracy is the political 
manifestation of this enfeeblement. 
This ethnographic study of democracy’s origins takes a seemingly unsavoury 
turn in The Genealogy of Morality, when Nietzsche equates master morality with an 
‘Aryan conquering race’ and slave morality with the ‘dark-skinned and especially the 
dark-haired man’ (GM I 5, KSA 5 264). Whilst in Beyond Nietzsche saw democracy 
as emanating from an unresolved and detrimental conflict between master and slave 
morality, in the Genealogy Nietzsche appears to suggest it is not solely the moral but 
also the physiological victory of the slaves over the masters. There he asks: 
to all intents and purposes the subject race has ended up by regaining the 
upper hand in skin colour, shortness of forehead and perhaps even in 
intellectual and social instincts: who can give any guarantee that modern 
democracy…[is] not in essence a huge throw-back – and that the conquering 
master race, that of the Aryans, is not physiologically being defeated as well? 
(ibid). 
 
If from our perspective this makes for uncomfortable reading, during 
Nietzsche’s own time this language was common currency, and the theories he 
expresses acceptable scientific ones. Andreas Retzius had classified Europeans into 
two categories: ‘dolichocephalic’, i.e. ‘long-headed’ Nordic Europeans who were 
meant to be blond and blue-eyed; and ‘brachycephalic’, i.e. ‘round-headed’ 
Mediterraneans whom Nietzsche is referring to here.
33
 Antiquarians had just 
discovered that Sanskrit was related to all European languages, and this gave rise to 
the myth of an original Ur-Volk, whom Schlegel christened the Aryans, who had 
emigrated from India and conquered Europe in prehistoric times
34
 – hence 
Nietzsche’s view of the Aryan conquering master race. It was philologists who had 
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 For Paul Bourget and Charles Féré’s influence on Nietzsche idea of the degeneration of the will see 
Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 
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33
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lead the way in the discovery of the Indo-European link, and this explains why 
Nietzsche, himself trained as a philologist, takes an etymological perspective when it 
comes to explaining the origins of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the Genealogy (GM I 4, KSA 5 
262), and why he deduces that the Celts where blond: ‘the word fin (for example, in 
the name Fin-Gal), the term designating nobility and finally the good, noble and pure, 
originally referred to the blond-headed man’ (GM I 5, KSA 5 264).   
 Nietzsche thus accepts this theory of the Aryan race as historical fact and 
builds his own theory of master and slave morality on it. Indeed, Nietzsche appears to 
be more interested in delineating the different moralities than the exact physical 
attributes these moralities manifest themselves through: he is more interested in 
values than he is in race. He lists ‘Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, 
Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings’ as examples of these ‘blond beasts of prey’ 
(GM I 11, KSA 5 274), of which one at minimum – depending on where one places 
the Arabs (Berbers?) – could never have been fair-headed. In this sense then the 
‘blond beast’ is a metaphor for a lion, the noble king of the jungle, and the Aryan and 
Celtic races just so happen to be the historical conquering races of Europe, but may 
take on other non-Aryan attributes in other circumstances (Arabian, Japanese). There 
is therefore both a literal and figurative aspect to Nietzsche’s account of the blond 
beasts of prey: whilst historically the European conquerors were blond (literal), 
Nietzsche then uses this theory and applies it to the rest of the world (figurative).
35
  
 One of the key figures in the development of these ideas is the self-styled 
Count Arthur de Gobineau, who was an intellectual companion to Wagner when 
Nietzsche frequented his circle in the late 1860’s and early 1870’s.36 In the event 
Gobineau’s successor, the Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain, became 
Wagner’s son-in-law, and his Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, published in 
1899, added the anti-Semitic dimension to Gobineau’s thought which had not been 
particularly prevalent in the latter’s. Gobineau’s theory, as expressed in On the 
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Inequality of the Human Races, published between 1853-1855, and only translated in 
German a decade later, attributed to the French aristocracy a purer German – that is to 
say Frankish and ultimately Aryan – stock.37 The view at the time was that the purer 
the line the closer one was to the original Aryan conquering races, and all the benefits 
that went with that: the Teutons, Goths and Celts where thought to be the closest. But 
the decline and elimination of the French aristocracy, so Gobineau thought, which 
was brought about through interbreeding, lead to a generally mongrelised and 
plebeian levelling, of which democracy was the political expression. For Gobineau 
racial purity was the key to all civilisation and human history, leaving him desperately 
pessimistic about the future prospects of France and Europe.
38
 
 Many of Gobineau’s theories find an echo in Nietzsche’s view of democracy: 
that it is the political manifestation of a general decline in human physiology, brought 
about through the interbreeding of different classes. But already Nietzsche 
distinguishes himself by placing the emphasis on morality, whilst Gobineau 
underlined race. Indeed, if Nietzsche often seems to conceive of the world in 
racialised terms, this is habitually in a rather vague or generic manner, instead of the 
more precise meaning it might have today, or the word is used as a stand-in for other 
terms: Nietzsche speaks of the ‘French’ or ‘English’ race (instead of nation/people), 
or again of a ‘master’ or ‘slave’ race (instead of class/caste). 39  It is part of the 
language people used at the time to express themselves: what is important to see is 
what use Nietzsche himself made of it. In the end, Nietzsche would not fall for 
Gobineau’s ultimately darkly pessimistic view of where this was all leading us. 
Instead, he would draw the exact opposite, and as optimistic as Gobineau’s was 
pessimistic, conclusion: that the levelling of the modern European would lead to a 
new, interracial, European aristocracy. 
Previously in The Wanderer and his Shadow we saw how for Nietzsche the 
independence-inducing institutions of democracy laid the foundation upon which a 
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new aristocracy could come into being. In Beyond Good and Evil he adds the more 
physiological aspect to this development: 
behind all the moral and political foregrounds that are indicated by formulas 
like [Europe’s democratic movement], an immense physiological process is 
taking place and constantly gaining ground – the process of increasing 
similarity between Europeans, their growing detachment from the conditions 
under which climate or class-bound races originate, their increasing 
independence from that determinate milieu where for centuries the same 
demands would be inscribed on the soul and the body – and so the slow 
approach of an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of person who, 
physiologically speaking, is typified by a maximal degree of the art and force 
of adaptation (BGE 242, KSA 5 182). 
 
What Nietzsche is talking about here is the ‘European in becoming’, namely the 
‘Good Europeans’ (BGE 241, KSA 5 180), who will arise through multinational 
unions and will become the new European nobility. Indeed Nietzsche, somewhat 
ironically given the uses he was subsequently put to, actively encourages the union of 
Jews and Junkers for the breeding of his new ruling caste, explaining that it would be 
extremely interesting to see whether the genius for money, patience and intellect (the 
latter especially missing in the Junkers), could be productively married to the 
‘hereditary art of commanding and obeying’ (BGE 251, KSA 5 192).  
 We can add that there are institutional, economic and cultural facets to this 
European coming together. Already in the discussion of democracy in The Wanderer 
and his Shadow, and specifically the aphorism on ‘The victory of democracy’, 
Nietzsche describes there that once the people are able to gain power through ‘great 
majorities in parliament’, they will ‘attack with progressive taxation the whole 
dominant system of capitalists, merchants and financiers, and will in fact create a 
middle class’ (WS 292, KSA 2 683). So through universal suffrage and the Reichstag 
a middle class will be developed on the basis of redistributive taxation. ‘The practical 
result of this increasing democratisation’, Nietzsche continues, will be a ‘European 
league of nations, in which each individual nation, delimited by the proper 
geographical frontiers, has the position of a canton with its separate rights’. Because 
of the democratic ‘craze for novelty and experiment’, echoing the discussion we had 
above, Nietzsche thinks that ‘small account will be taken of the historical memories 
of previously existing nations’, but that instead the ‘correction of frontiers’ will be 
carried out to serve the ‘interest of the great cantons and at the same time of the whole 
federation’. These corrections will be the task of future diplomats, who will not be 
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backed by armies but ‘motives and utilities’, of who will be students of ‘civilisation, 
agriculturists and commercial experts’.  
Along with this institutional move towards unity, Nietzsche, in his notes at the 
time of Beyond Good and Evil (1885), sees an economic reason for this 
Europeanisation. There he explains that what he is concerned with, and what he sees 
preparing itself slowly and hesitatingly, is a ‘United Europe’:  
the need of a new unity there comes a great explanatory economic fact: the 
small states of Europe, I refer to all our present kingdoms and ‘empires’, will 
in a short time become economically untenable, owing to the mad, 
uncontrolled struggle for the possession of local and international trade. 
(Money is even now compelling European nations to amalgamate into one 
power) (KSA 11 37[9]). 
 
Finally, in the work of Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, 
Schopenhauer and even Wagner, Nietzsche discerns in Beyond the preparation for a 
new cultural synthesis and the groundwork for the European of the future. ‘Europe 
wishes to be one’, he concludes (BGE 256, KSA 5 201).  
 These passages shed light on a section discussed above, namely that a general 
enfeeblement that manifests itself through democracy ensues from intermixing. 
Whilst it might be the case that such an intermixing results in a general enfeeblement 
of the population at large, those who are able to master their conflicting natures are 
able to transform themselves into something more: ‘then arise those marvellously 
incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, those enigmatic men, predestined for 
conquering and circumventing others’, of which Nietzsche gives Alcibiades, Caesar 
and those he considers to be the first Europeans, Friedrich II and Leonardo da Vinci, 
as examples (BGE 200, KSA 5 120). It is in this double-movement – towards 
enfeeblement and strength – which gives rise to two different types that we must 
understand how the new European master race is due to come about. As Nietzsche 
puts it: 
future Europeans will be exceedingly garrulous, impotent and eminently 
employable workers who will feel the need for masters and commanders like 
they need their daily bread. The democratisation of Europe in effect amounts 
to the creation of a type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense: the 
strong man will need to be stronger and richer than he has perhaps ever been 
before – thanks to the lack of prejudice in his schooling, to an enormous 
diversity in practice, art and masks. What I’m trying to say is: the 
democratisation of Europe is at the same time an involuntary exercise in the 
breeding of tyrants – understanding that in every sense of the word, including 
its most spiritual’ (BGE 242, KSA 5 182). 
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Conclusion 
 
Bernard Crick has offered three ways of thinking about democracy: democracy as a 
‘principle or doctrine of government’, democracy as a ‘set of institutional 
arrangements or constitutional devices’, and democracy as a ‘type of behaviour’, 
which he helpfully defines as ‘the antithesis of both deference and of unsociability’.40 
In sum: Nietzsche is opposed to democracy as a principle or doctrine of government, 
as he understands it as the coming to power of herd morality. But he is more 
ambiguous when it comes to democratic mores and behaviour: he is opposed to 
‘misarchism’, the democratic mind-set of being against all forms of authority, and 
sees physiological degeneration behind the rising tide of democratisation, but he also 
perceives in this movement the germs of a new multiracial European nobility. Finally, 
Nietzsche views the institutional aspect of democracy in a generally positive light, as 
it mounts bulwarks to defend culture, and ultimately provides the foundations upon 
which this new aristocracy can come into being.  
I have highlighted in this article the privileged position Nietzsche occupied as 
a commentator of the rise of democracy in Germany due to his historical location, and 
how he was quick to identify problems with democracy which would become staples 
of political theory in the subsequent century.
41
 Indeed, his analysis of democracy 
maps itself particularly well onto Margaret Anderson’s Practicing Democracy, one of 
the leading historical studies of the period. Anderson’s main thesis is that it is through 
the very practice of democracy that the people were gradually able to acquire more 
rights and liberties from what was originally intended simply as a ratification of the 
powers that be. The logic of party competition meant citizens were afforded more and 
more political rights – secret ballots, voting booths etc. – and this chimes well with 
Nietzsche’s view that democracy’s aim is to foster independence; independence of 
opinion, mode of life and employment. In fact, in his ‘The victory of democracy’ 
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aphorism of The Wanderer and his Shadow, Nietzsche explains that in their desire to 
combat socialism, the German political parties are forced to appeal more and more to 
the masses: ‘in the long run democracy alone gains the advantage, for all parties are 
now compelled to flatter the “people” and grant them facilities and liberties of all 
kinds, with the result that the people finally become omnipotent’ (WS 292, KSA 2 
683). Part of the process of claiming these new rights was challenging established 
authority itself, and Anderson is alive to the fact that ‘it was the nature of the imperial 
franchise to turn every contest into a challenge to authority’.42 Or, in other words: 
misarchism.  
When Nietzsche’s conceptualising of democracy as herd morality is paired 
with Plato’s view of democracy as mob rule in The Republic, we can see how 
Nietzsche offers a very interesting link between ancient and modern critiques of 
democracy. In this sense Nietzsche may indeed be one of the most acute 
commentators of democracy we have, although we cannot conceived of him simply as 
its opponent, as the anti-democratic reading of Nietzsche has tended to do, but need 
also investigate where he thought such a development would lead, as I have tried to 
do over the course of this paper. Aside from his discussion of degeneration – though 
as I have argued he ultimately transforms this into a question of morality, which is 
where his novelty lies – Nietzsche’s view of the increasing mixing of Europeans, 
aided and abated by cultural, intellectual, institutional and economic factors, leading 
to a unified Europe seems rather prescient in terms of the Europe we know today. 
Nietzsche, therefore, on the one hand serves as a good guide to the 
democratisation of late nineteenth century Germany and Europe, aspects of which – 
political parties, secret voting – we would recognise as features of our own political 
system. On the other he remains one of the sharpest critics of the birth of democracy 
he experienced first-hand, due to his pinpointing of key criticisms – problems of 
majoritarianism and democratic legitimacy – which were to become staples of 
democratic debates in the subsequent century, alongside connecting with a long arc of 
anti-democratic thought stretching back to Plato. But his main contribution to 
democratic thought, I argue, is in the conceptual tools he affords us in trying to 
understand democracy through his notions of ‘herd morality’, ‘misarchism’ and the 
genealogical links it entertains with Christianity, which still provide us with powerful 
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prisms through which to analyse democracy today. For instance, the term 
‘misarchism’, in revealing the anti-authority foundations of the democratic mind-set, 
might allow us to better understanding the continuing – and from this perspective 
irreversible – erosion of trust in public institutions. Such a mind-set is part-and-parcel 
of democracy, and to see this allows us to better understand what can and cannot be 
done about it.  
Nietzsche is quite singular in the nineteenth century in denouncing democracy 
and Christianity as one – we can easily think of examples of thinkers rejecting one but 
not the other – in particular the absolutist claims both make. Whilst there do exist 
some studies of the relationship Christianity entertains with democracy, none, to my 
knowledge, have approached it from the genealogical perspective Nietzsche is 
advocating here, and such an approach would undoubtedly shed light on our 
contemporary political system.
43
 Indeed, for non-Christians the strong link Nietzsche 
posits between democracy and Christianity might prove a little unsettling, or at least 
might force a rethink of the basis of their commitment to democracy. If God is dead, 
then the question is whether democracy is part of the ‘shadows of God’ Nietzsche 
decried (GS 125, KSA 3 180): that whilst we no longer believe in its religious 
underpinning, we still adhere to the same worldview.  We are no longer Christians, 
but we still live according to its values. Can one be a democrat if one is no longer a 
Christian? Does the realisation of the Christian origins of democracy, if Nietzsche is 
right, compel a rethink of one’s commitment to democracy?44 
The force of Nietzsche’s analysis was to expose how such a worldview is 
ultimately grounded in some sort of herd-morality: that the secularised lives we live 
today have their roots not simply in Christianity, but in slave morality too. And herd-
morality still captures something fundamental about how we do live our lives today: 
we no longer appeal to a divine transcendence to orient our lives, but, lacking another 
point of reference, we model ourselves on the behaviour of the people around us. 
What Nietzsche shows us is how that reflex was the foundation upon which 
Christianity took root in the first place, and how we have yet – against our best 
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atheistic protestations – to overcome it, to found new values and live our lives beyond 
good and evil. Do we want our political system, and how we live our lives, to be 
rooted in herd-morality? These are some of the insights and challenges Nietzsche’s 
critique of democracy offers us. 
 
